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I. STATUS
A. NON-MARITAL UNIONS
he subject of unisexual unions, or same-sex marriages as they are
sometimes called with some perversity of language, has become a
particular favorite of student editors.' Much of the writing on the
subject has tended to be concerned with the recent Hawaiian case, 2 as
well as the Congressional enactment popularly called the Defense of
Marriage Act,3 which purports to allow one state to ignore or discounte-
nance such a union sanctioned by the law of another state.
The most recent appellate examination of claims arising from a unisex-
ual arrangement in Texas was made in Zaremba v. Cliburn.4 There it was
asserted that a cohabital sexual relationship of seventeen years between
two men had produced a partnership between them, and the dissolution
of that association had produced grounds for legal recovery for breach of
contract. In remanding the case to the trial court, the Fort Worth Court
1. Perhaps the most arresting title is Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to
Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709 (1996). But many other are avail-
able: see Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking
Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871 (1997); David L. Chambers, Polygamy and
Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (1997); David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex
Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1 (1997); Marc
A. Fajer, Toward Respectful Representation: Some Thoughts of Selling Same-Sex Marriage,
15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 599 (1997); Kathryn Dean Kendell, Principles and Prejudice:
Lesbian and Gay Civil Marriage and the Realization of Equality, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 81(1996); Lynne Marie Kohm, The Homosexual "Union": Should Gay and Lesbian Partner-
ships be Granted the Same Status as Marriage?, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 51 (1996); Larry Kramer,
Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception,
106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997); Diane M. Guillerman, Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act:
The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing Battle to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage, 34 Hous. L.
REV. 425 (1997); Rodney Patton, Comment, Queerly Unconstitutional?: South Carolina
Bans Same-Sex Marriage, 48 S.C. L. REV. 685 (1997).
2. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), discussed in Joseph W. McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REV. 1225, 1226
(1995); see also Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1996)); see Arthur R. Landever, The Constitutional Arguments For and Against the De-
fense of Marriage Act, 11 AM. J. FAM. L. 23 (1997).
4. 949 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no writ).
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of Appeals held that claims based on alleged promises made in relation to
such an arrangement would fail without .allegations of written evidence of
such promises under the 1.987 amendment to the Texas Statute of
Frauds.5 The plaintiff's failure to allege a signed promise in writing,
therefore, made the plaintiff's pleading fatally defective and incurable by
amendment.6 The court made it clear in quoting from the legislative his-
tory of the amendment that the terms of the statute apply not to the
promise of non-marital cohabitation itself but only to promises collateral
thereto.7 With respect to assertions of infliction of emotional distress
arising out of an alleged exposure to disease, the appellate court con-
cluded that the claimant might amend his pleading to restate that claim.8
B. INFORMAL MARRIAGE
Two cases considered together before the Texas Supreme Court9 con-
cerned the one-year limitation period provided in former section 1.91 of
the Family Code (now a two-years period in section 2.401(b)) for assert-
ing the validity of an informal marriage after the couple have separated.
In both actions the informal marriage was asserted over one year, but less
than two years, after the separation, and in both actions recovery was
sought under the wrongful death and survival statutes.10 In Shepherd v.
Ledford1" the existence of the elements necessary for an informal mar-
riage were stipulated by the parties. On the issue of the one-year bar to
the claim of the validity of the marriage the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
had affirmed the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff on the grounds
that the two-years limitation period in article 4590i, section 10.0112 of the
revised statutes prevails over the one-year period for assertion of a valid
informal marriage.13 The wrongful death action, therefore, succeeded
under the facts alleged. In Fuentes v. Transamerican Natural Gas Corp.14
the San Antonio Court of Appeals had reversed the trial court's summary
judgment for the defendant and had also held that the two-years limita-
tion period of section 10.01 prevails over the provision of the Family
5. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(a), (b)(3) (Vernon 1987): "[A]n agree-
ment made on ... consideration of nonmarital ... cohabitation ... is not enforceable
unless the ... agreement, or a memorandum of it is (1) in writing; and (2) signed by the
person to be charged with the ... agreement .... The court interpreted the statute to
cover promises made prior but collateral to a relationship that continued after the amend-
ment. See Zaremba, 949 S.W.2d at 827.
6. See id. at 829.
7. See id. at 827, 832-33 (following Hollom v. Carey, 343 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. App.
1984)).
8. See id. at 829.
9. See Shepherd v. Ledford, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 333, 1998 WL 30012 (Jan. 29, 1998).
10. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.004(a), 71.021(b) (Vernon 1997).
11. 926 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996), affd, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 333, 1998
WL 30012 (Jan. 29, 1998).
12. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
13. See Shepherd, 926 S.W.2d at 410.
14. 933 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996), affd, Shepherd v. Ledford, 962
S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1998).
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Code. 15 In Shepherd v. Ledford, in which the facts to prove the informal
marriage were stipulated, the Texas Supreme Court disagreed with the
court of appeals that there was any controlling conflict between the two
statutes as to timely assertion of the claim.16 Standing to sue under the
Family Code had been satisfied by stipulation. In Fuentes, on the other
hand, the plaintiff was barred from bringing her action because of her
non-compliance with the provision of the Family Code. 17
Since its amendment in 1995 and recodification in 1997, the one-year
provision has been replaced with a two-year limitation in section 2.401(b)
of the Family Code.18
With respect to the survivorship action in Shepherd, because the dece-
dent had no descendants and only a personal estate, his entire estate
vested in his widow, and she was, therefore, entitled to maintain the sur-
vivorship action as the decedent's heir at law. 19 In Fuentes there was no
proved widow and, hence, the claimant had no standing to sue.20
C. CEREMONIAL MARRIAGE
In its effort to strengthen marital bonds and, thus, to turn aside the
mounting incidence of divorce, the Louisiana Legislature instituted a type
of ceremonial marriage popularly called a covenant marriage that by its
terms requires the couple, in applying for a license, to attest to having had
counseling prior to marriage and to agree to have counseling prior to any
effort to dissolve the marriage by divorce, as well as assenting to a waiting
period of two years before a divorce may be granted. 21 It has been long
argued,22 without any apparent effect, that a standard Texas ceremonial
marriage (with solemn vows of lifelong duration provable by the testi-
mony of a large number of witnesses before whom the promises were
made) produces a cause of action for breach of contract (if not a bar to
divorce). One wonders whether this sort of written agreement will have
the effect that the proponents of the Louisiana Act ascribe to the cove-
nants provided there. The popularity of divorce in Texas is such that it is
unlikely that the legislative contagion of such hopeful notions as those
expressed by the Louisiana Legislature will spread to Texas.
D. INTERSPOUSAL TORT
It was asserted in Guerrero v. Memorial Medical Center23 that a wife's
employer was liable for her death when she was murdered by her es-
15. See id. at 626-27.
16. See Shepherd, 962 S.W.2d at 32.
17. See id. at 34.
18. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
19. See Shepherd, 962 S.W.2d at 32.
20. See id. at 34.
21. See 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 1380 (H.B. 756).
22. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 109, 128-30 (1978).
23. 938 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, no writ).
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tranged husband on the employer's premises. The Beaumont Court of
Appeals held that when the employer did not know and had no reason to
know that the husband had mistreated his wife and was about to murder
her, the husband's acts were unforeseeable by the employer, and the em-
ployer, therefore, had no duty to protect the wife from her husband. 24
E. Loss OF CONSORTIUM
In Dalrymple v. The University of Texas System 25 a university professor
sued the university in connection with the termination of his employment,
and his wife asserted a cause of action for loss of consortium as a conse-
quence of intentional infliction of emotional distress by the employer. In
the wife's appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant the
Austin Court of Appeals concluded that some facts can give rise to an
employee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in an em-
ployment context and, thus, the employee's spouse may assert a cause of
action for loss of consortium in such circumstances when the employee's
claims result in physical injury.26
A somewhat different point was before the Beaumont Court of Ap-
peals in Isern v. Watson.27 There the claim for loss of consortium for a
spouses's physical injury was not in dispute. The defendant, however,
complained that the claimant-husband might not assert three independ-
ent grounds for recovery in connection with the loss: (1) loss of his wife's
services as a housewife; (2) loss of his marital rights; and (3) his loss of his
wife's companionship and society. In the absence of any assertion of au-
thority to the contrary the appellate court approved all three elements of
damage for loss of consortium. 28
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. CONTRACT IN CONSIDERATION OF MARRIAGE
Marsh v. Marsh29 is a very odd case from the Fourteenth Court of Ap-
peals. The husband contested the validity of a premarital agreement, but
neither party sought a divorce, though the parties were separated, and the
contestant did not assert that the agreement was merely a promise to
make a gift.30 Though the husband asserted at the trial that he did not
enter into the agreement voluntarily, no appeal was taken on that point.
The appeal turned wholly on whether the premarital agreement was un-
24. See id. at 795.
25. 949 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. granted).
26. See id. at 404-05.
27. 942 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, pet. filed).
28. See id. at 197.
29. 949 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).
30. See Hibbler v. Knight, 735 S.W.2d 924, 926-27 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (unenforceability of premarital agreement to make a gift), com-
mented on in Joseph W. MeKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1990).
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conscionable, 31 a term that does not lend itself to general objective appli-
cation in this context. Finally, the spouses' dispute had apparently wound
up with a disagreement as to who should have paid the gift tax on the
transaction, if one was due, but most of the promised gift (if such it was) 32
was never carried out.
As a sort of sideshow, the trial included testimony by two distinguished
and seasoned experts on Texas family law, both Certified Family Law
Specialists, who expressed opinions that were so different as to be not
easily referable to the same provisions or the same code. The curious
disparity of opinions aptly illustrates the meaningless quality of the term
unconscionable, stripped of the element of fairness by an earlier decision
of the same court, 33 and of the element of volition specifically provided as
an independent sole test of validity in the preceding subparagraph of the
statute.34 Two years ago, a committee of the Family Law Section recom-
mended repeal of the unconscionability-and-lack-of-disclosure test for
enforceability of premarital and marital partitions and exchanges in for-
mer sections 5.46 and 5.55 of the Family Code (now sections 4.006 and
4.105) so that the sole test of validity would be volition, but with an addi-
tional provision setting out some badges of volition for the assistance of
the finder of fact.35
The agreement in Marsh was simply an old-fashioned contract made in
consideration of marriage, and it provided that the husband would set up
a trust for the wife to include one half of his estate. The contract satisfied
the writing requirement prescribed in the Texas Business and Commerce
31. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1998). Lack of disclosure
of the other spouse's financial condition, the other element of § 4.006(a)(2), was not dis-
cussed at length because the court failed to find unconscionability of the agreement. See
Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at 743.
32. See id.; see also Miele v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
(discussing agreement made in consideration of marriage and relinquishment of certain
rights by the wife-to-be).
33. See Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989,
writ denied).
34. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006(a)(2).
35. See Recommendation of the Committee on Revision of Title 1 of the Family Code
(on file with the SMU Law Review Association), approved by the Council of the Family
Law Section of the State Bar of Texas on May 10, 1996, to replace Texas Family Code
§§ 5.46 and 5.55 (now §§ 4.006 and 4.105) with a single test for enforcement.
§ 5.46 Enforcement.
(a) A premarital or marital agreement, partition, or exchange is not en-
forceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that he or
she did not execute the agreement, partition, or exchange voluntarily.
(b) In determining whether a party acted voluntarily, consideration may be
given to whether the party (1) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclo-
sure of the property or financial obligations of the other party, did not volun-
tarily or expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or
financial obligation of the other party beyond the disclosure provided, and
did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of
the property or financial obligations of the other party; or (2) acted as a
result of the exertion of fraud, duress, or overreaching by the other party.
(c) The standards of enforcement and defenses referred to in this section
are the exclusive standards of enforcement and defenses.
1052 [Vol. 51
HUSBAND AND WIFE
Code, section 26.01, but article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution
had no bearing whatever on this contract. The contract was
enforceable. 36
B. TRACING
The community presumption, statutorily renumbered as section 3.003
of the Family Code 37 during the 1997 legislative session, maintains its de-
terminative position in favor of community characterization of any
"[p]roperty possessed during or on dissolution of a marriage. '38 The pre-
sumption in favor of the community estate must be rebutted as before by
clear and convincing evidence.39
In Winkle v. Winkle40 the court relied on an imprecise mix of tracing
and contractual principles to characterize the purchase of a lot during
marriage. Though the terms of the contract between the seller and buyer
are not described, the down-payment on the contract of purchase was
made with community property and the rest of the price was paid at clos-
ing with the husband's separate property. The court nevertheless relied
on the down-payment in characterizing the purchase as a community lot
and fortified this conclusion with the statement that the lot was "intended
as a home of the community. ' 41 Although the intention of the buyer may
assist the court in interpreting the contract of purchase, it is not the major
consideration in determining the characterization of property as commu-
nity or separate. 42 The court treated the payment of the husband's sepa-
rate funds as establishing a mere right of reimbursement. 43 The
imprecision of the court's opinion is such that the conclusions are not of
very much value except as intimations to the approach to characterization
by the Corpus Christi court.
C. UNVESTED STOCK OPTIONS
In Bodin v. Bodin4 4 the court concluded that unvested stock options
received by the husband from his employer during marriage were com-
munity property if their receipt was merely contingent on his continued
employment.4 5 The court analogized the options to unvested military re-
tirement benefits as in Cearley v. Cearley.46 Thus, the options would be
subject to division on divorce.47 But how might they be exercised effec-
36. See Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at 743.
37. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
38. Id.
39. See id. § 3.003(b).
40. 951 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. denied).
41. Id. at 88.
42. See id. (citing Welder v. Welder, 794 S.W.2d 420, 427 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1990, no writ)).
43. See id. at 89.
44. 955 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
45. See id. at 381.




tively if the court awards them to the non-employee and the options can
be exercised only by the person who earned them? Despite their poten-
tial future value, the value of the options at divorce is controlling for the
purpose of judicial division.48 Nor is the analogy to retirement benefits
exact because stock options must be exercised with separate funds in the
future.
D. PROFESSIONAL GOODWILL
Salinas v. Rafiti49 was not a family law case but a partnership cases, but
it is important to family lawyers for the Texas Supreme Court's discussion
of the distinction between commercial goodwill (a business asset of a
partnership or corporation, reflecting its locality, name, and reputation,
for example) and professional goodwill that "attaches to a professional
person because of confidence in the skill and ability of the individual" 50
as exemplified by the 1972 opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in Nail v.
Nail.51 The Salinas decision is also significant for the Court's further
analysis of the factors in valuation and characterization of business inter-
ests that the decision has provoked. 52
E. TRUST INCOME
In Ridgell v. Ridgel 53 the wife was the beneficiary of two testamentary
trusts (numbers 2 and 4) from which she had the income for life and the
corpus of each trust passed to her children after certain compulsory distri-
butions of corpus were made to the wife (if then living) at fixed times.
The court held that because the wife received the income from the trusts
and had "expectancy interests" in corpus, the distributions of trust in-
come were community property.54 The court failed to note the signifi-
cance of the intervals of time dividing the gifts in trust specified by the
settlors of the trusts. The succession of gifts of income and of principal of
the trust are distinct in time. The fact that parts of the corpus of the trust
produced income payable to the beneficiary early in the life of the trust
and that these parts of corpus might be distributable to the beneficiary at
some later time should not affect characterization of income paid in the
past. Further, to say that the beneficiary of a trust is the "real owner" of
the "equitable or beneficial title to the trust property"55 is a very mislead-
ing way of saying that rules of equity allow the beneficiary to enforce the
48. See Berry v. Berry, 786 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1990).
49. 948 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. 1997).
50. Id. at 290.
51. 486 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex. 1972). See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband
and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1475, 1484-85 (1993).
52. See George P. Roach, The Texas Supreme Court Revisits Professional Goodwill,
1998 STATE BAR [OF TEXAS FAMILY LAW] SECTION REPORT 20 (no. 1, 1998). As a histori-
cal milepost, it is perhaps significant to observe that Nail was decided on the same day as
Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972).
53. 960 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet. h.).
54. See id. at 149.
55. Id. at 147.
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trust. The court's conclusion that equitable right to income constitutes
separate title in corpus is therefore wholly unjustified when it is realized
that the beneficiary has no present entitlement to the corpus. The benefi-
ciary's only present interest is the right to receive trust income and that
right is therefore properly characterized as separate property. Until the
happening of the events specified by the settlors, the beneficiary is not
entitled to any of the trust corpus as a future gift of the settlors. This
analysis has been followed in numerous cases beginning with the decision
of the Texas Supreme Court in Hutchison v. Mitchell.56 Over half a cen-
tury ago, in an effort to give favorable federal tax treatment to such trust
income as community property, federal courts interpreting Texas law rea-
soned that because the beneficiary owns an equitable estate in the trust
corpus the income from that estate is community property. 57 But saying
that the beneficiary owns an equitable estate in the corpus of a trust is
merely a figure of speech denoting that the beneficiary in a court of eq-
uity may enforce the present right to income from the trust. In reality the
income is the only present entitlement of the beneficiary. It was acquired
by gift from the settlor of the trust and is, therefore, the beneficiary's
separate property.58 Two arguments may be adduced to oppose this con-
clusion. First, there is the sentimental and historically political one that
the Supreme Court of Texas that decided Hutchison v. Mitchell in 1873
was not a properly constituted court, and its opinions are therefore not
worthy of stare decisis.59 That unreconstructed Confederate argument
was noted but not followed by Hutcheson, C.J., in reaching the conclu-
sion on federal taxation of trust income 60 that Congress finally approved
by adopting the marital joint income tax return in 1948.61 The second
argument is based an Anglo-American legal state of mind that finds it
difficult to comprehend the notion of a continuing gift not based on im-
mediate delivery but made possible by a trust that subsists over a period
of time and produces income that is delivered periodically. But a gift
occurring over a period of time is precisely the most accurate way to de-
scribe the reality of this situation. A different argument, however, must
support the assertion that the income of a self-settled trust is separate
property because the settlor cannot make a gift to himself. But just as
one may sell separate property and thus hold the proceeds of sale as sepa-
rate property, a single person may transform his separate property irrevo-
cably into some other interest. For example, the owner of separate
56. 39 Tex. 488 (1873). See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 50 SMU L. REV. 1189, 1200 (1997).
57. See Commissioner v. Wilson, 76 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935); Commissioner v. Zeus, 69
F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1934).
58. See Regis W. Campfield, Interspousal Transfers, 32 Sw. L.J. 1091, 1134-62 (1979);
Regis W. Campfield, Wills & Trusts, Annual Survey at Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 53, 63 (1974).
59. Per Moore, C.J., in Taylor v. Murphy, 50 Tex. 291, 295 (1878); see James W. Paul-
sen & James Hambleton, Confederates and Carpetbaggers: The Precedential Value of Deci-
sions from Civil War and Reconstruction Eras, 51 TEX. BAR J. 916 (1988).
60. See Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1945).
61. See Revenue Act of 1948, Act of April 2, 1948, ch. 168., 62 Stat. 110.
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property may in effect translate separate property into nothing more than
an income interest from that property by making the separate property
the corpus of an irrevocable trust in favor of the settlor with no further
interest in the settlor. In that case the settlor in effect changes the sepa-
rate corpus to the separate income interest.62 In the case of a trust settled
by a married person for her own benefit, an effective argument against
the conclusion that the income is separate property is available to the
settlor's spouse: that the Texas Constitution's allowing spouses to parti-
tion income from separate property, or to allow one spouse only to give it
to the other spouse, implies a constitutional prohibition of one spouse's
unilateral act of creating a trust of separate property in order to turn the
income from the trust into separate property.
The court in RidgeUl63 also dealt with the wife's self-settled trust
(number 3). The court concluded that there was no need to characterize
the income from that trust because the trust's loan to provide funds to
buy particular realty was repaid with separate funds, "hence separate
property begat separate property. '64 The analysis of the issue presented
is not that simple though the facts concerning the loan are not described.
If the trust (self-settled with separate funds) was a distinct entity and it
borrowed the money to buy the realty on a note that could be satisfied by
recourse only to the corpus of the trust (enlarged by a loan of a separate
certificate of deposit lent by the settlor), the proceeds of the loan would
seem to belong to the separate trust corpus. Even if constitutionally the
trust had been nothing more than an agency account of the wife, the non-
recourse terms of the loan would have made the proceeds of the loan and
the realty in which they were invested the wife's separate property. If,
however, the loan were entered into by the wife of her agent without
limitation of liability to her separate property, the loan proceeds would
be community property regardless of the fact of their actual repayment
with separate proceeds. 65
F. RECOVERY FOR PERSONAL INJURY
In a recent article 66 Professor Pamela George dealt with the problems
of proving the separate elements of a personal injury recovery when the
injured plaintiff is later involved in a divorce. However close the bond of
marriage may be at or soon after the injury, the personal-injury lawyer
must be aware that the nature and stress of a severe injury may make a
subsequent divorce almost certain if the death of the injured spouse does
62. See Lemke v. Lemke, 929 S.W.2d 662 (Tex App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied),
noted in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 50 SMU L. REV. 1189, 1200 (1997). There, the trust was settled by a single person.
63. 960 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
64. See id. at 150.
65. See Broussard v. Tian, 156 Tex. 371, 295 S.W.2d 406 (1956); Heidenheimer Bros. v.
McKeen, 62 Tex. 229 (1885).
66. See Pamela E. George, Whose Injury? Whose Property? The Characterization of
Personal Injury Settlements Upon Dissolution of Marriage in Community Property States,
32 IDAHo L. REV. 575 (1996).
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not sooner dissolve the marriage. All too often the attorney's position in
protecting the interest of the injured spouse is exacerbated by the fact
that he was brought into the case by the victim's spouse, who may later be
the petitioner for the resulting divorce. Thus, a difficult ethical problem
is posed at the outset of representation which should be solved initially in
order to avoid its arising later.67 The same problems of characterizing the
separate elements of recovery are encountered in an estate settlement as
in a divorce, though the change of the law of intestate succession in
198768 has somewhat reduced the likelihood of an attorney's facing that
problem because the surviving spouse's position is so much stronger as to
the victim's community interest on intestacy, and the victim's needs are
no longer in issue. The result that the victim's attorney should seek to
achieve prior to divorce is a determination of the separate elements of
the recovery that will bind both spouses. Assuring that result may never-
theless pose considerable difficulty.
In Osborn v. Osborn69 the injured husband achieved a reversal and
remand of the trial court's characterization of an entire personal injury
recovery as community property because he was not given an opportunity
to be heard after he filed a general denial in response to his wife's peti-
tion for divorce.70 Although his posture for settlement may have been
somewhat improved by his appellate victory, his ability to show the sepa-
rate character of elements of his personal injury recovery faced all the
difficulties discussed by Professor George. 71
G. RETIREMENT BENEFITS
Baw v. Baw72 is another in a growing body of intermediate appellate
court decisions 73 that define the mode for valuing the community compo-
nent of a defined contribution retirement plan under which the employee
spouse acquired an interest successively while unmarried and married.
Following the prior cases, the Dallas Court of Appeals computed the
community element of the spouse's interest by subtracting the amount
contributed prior to marriage from the total amount of contributions at
the end of the marriage.74
In Boggs v. Boggs75 the Supreme Court of the United States concluded
that the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER-
67. Some thoughts of the late Everett Lord in this regard can be gleaned from the
discussion of Martin v. General Electric Co., 586 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1978), in which he
represented the injured plaintiff. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and
Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 71 (1974).
68. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 45 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
69. 961 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
70. See id. at 412.
71. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
72. 949 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, n.w.h.).
73. See Joseph W. M'Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 50 SMU L. REV. 1189, 1202 (1997).
74. See Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 767-68.
75. 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
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ISA) 76 preempts state property law so that a predeceasing non-employee
spouse has no interest in a private retirement fund of the employee
spouse 77 and, thus, cannot make an effective disposition over what would
have been under state law the predeceasing spouse's community interest
in the employee's private retirement fund created by his employer under
ERISA.78 Five members of the Court, with two justices joining in part,79
concluded that in ERISA Congress amply demonstrated its intent to pro-
tect a surviving spouse of the employee and to preempt state law with
respect the employee's deceased spouse. 80 The majority of the Court con-
tinued to read the anti-assignment and anti-alienation provisions of the
statute in a peculiar way. Such provisions in federal law date back to
efforts made by Congress to disengage the federal government from lia-
bility when its potential payees, American troops engaged in the Mexican
War, attempted to assign their forthcoming pay to local merchants along
the route of march. In Hisquerdo v. Hisquerdo81 the Court applied those
terms not to the voluntary act of a railroad worker whose retirement ben-
efits were controlled by a federal act, but to an order of a California di-
vorce court where he had been sued. In MCarty v. McCarty82 the Court
attributed the imposition of a judicial order to an involuntary military
pension beneficiary in a California court. In Boggs the most that the em-
ployee-pensioner seems to have done toward making an assignment or an
alienation was to be a domiciliary of Louisiana, where local property law
allows the spouse of a prospective pensioner to share in his earnings. 83
That such perversion of language, even though abetted by a definition in
the Federal Regulations, 84 does not embarrass the Court seems curious.
Neither the majority of the Court nor the dissenting justices seem to
have found very much in the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals with which they agreed. Two of the dissenting justices, however,
asked this pointed question: "Given Congress'[s] purpose of allowing
state courts to give first wives their community property share of pension
assets, why would Congress have intended to include a silent implication
that strips [the predeceasing wife] of an asset that may be the bulk of
[the] community property-simply because, instead of divorcing [her hus-
band], she remained his wife until she died?" 85 The answer, as the major-
ity of the Court put it, is that Congress was primarily concerned with the
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1994).
77. Retirement plans maintained by charitable institutions and for governmental em-
ployees are exempt from the operation of ERISA. See id. § 1001.
78. See Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1757.
79. Kennedy, J., delivered the majority opinion in part of which Rehnquist, C.J., and
Ginsburg, J., joined and from which Breyer and O'Connor, JJ., dissented, joined in part by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Ginsburg, J.
80. See id.
81. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
82. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
83. As pointed out by Breyer, J., joined by O'Connor, J., dissenting, in Boggs, 117 S.
Ct. at 1771-72.
84. See 26 CFR § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii), cited in Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1765.
85. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1776 (Breyer, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
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welfare of the living and not the dead. 86 If it should be argued 87 that the
estate of the predeceasing spouse may have a reimbursable claim against
the surviving employee-spouse, the majority opinion rebutted such an
argument. 88
H. REIMBURSEMENT
More fundamental issues of reimbursement were dealt with in other
cases. In Marburger v. Seminole Pipeline Co.89 recovery for community
reimbursement for benefits provided to a living spouse's separate realty
was sought against third persons as compensation for interference with
those rights as interests to real property. Though the defendants appar-
ently failed to raise the point, a right of marital reimbursement had not
arisen because the marriage of the parties had not been dissolved. But
even if a right of reimbursement had arisen (as the court seemed to as-
sume), the court made it clear that the right is not an ownership interest
in realty that will support a cause of action for its injury,90 as will a lease-
hold interest in the realty, for example. 91
In Winkle v. Winkle92 the husband sought reimbursement for his sepa-
rate property used to construct a house on what the court termed a com-
munity lot. In taking this expenditure outside the supposed rule that
separate funds used to discharge a couple's living expenses are not reim-
bursable, 93 the court relied on .authorities awarding marital reimburse-
ment for the separate payment of community debts,94 thus, in effect,
rejecting the supposed rule, which the court suggested should be confined
to "transitory" acquisitions. 95
In Hunt v. Hunt96 the wife complained that the divorce court had not
granted reimbursement for expenditure of community funds for support
of the husband's child of a prior marriage. The appellate court alluded to
the fact that community funds were also expended for the support of a
child of the wife by a prior marriage and that there was no abuse of judi-
86. See id. at 1761.
87. See Julie McDaniel Dallison, Comment, Disappearing Interests: ERISA Impliedly
Preempts the Predeceasing Nonemployee Spouse's Community Property Interest in the Em-
ployee's Retirement, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 477, 499-504 (1997).
88. See Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1766.
89. 957 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
90. See id. at 90 (citing Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 458-59 (Tex. 1983)).
91. See id. at 90 n.13.
92. 951 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied); see supra notes 40-
43 and accompanying text.
93. See Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 502-03, 260 S.W.2d 676, 683 (1953). For criti-
cism of this conclusion, see Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 1, 15 (1989).
94. See Winkle, 951 S.W.2d at 89 (citing Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex.
1988)); Jones v. Jones, 890 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied);
Graham v. Graham, 836 S.W.2d 308, 309-10 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ).
95. See Winkle, 951 S.W.2d at 89.
96. 952 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, n.w.h.).
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cial discretion in the trial court's decision,97 citing Pelzig v. Berkebile98
and Zieba v. Martin.99 The court also relied on those two authorities in
rejecting the wife's complaint for failure to reimburse the community es-
tate for contractual alimony payments made to the husband's former
wife. 100 This reliance suggests that the court regards such expense and
payments as unreimburseable rather then reimbursable but properly de-
nied in light of the equities of the case. If that is the court's view, it seems
unacceptable; it is certainly appropriate that community funds be ex-
pended to discharge support obligations of a spouse arising prior to mar-
riage, especially if no separate funds are available for that purpose, but it
is equally appropriate that the community estate be reimbursed for ex-
penditures of community funds to discharge responsibility of a spouse
arising prior to a marriage to which the community estate is attributable.
A distinction may be drawn, however, between the support of a child of a
prior marriage, which is founded in a continuing duty of support, and
maintenance of a former spouse, which is not based on a continuing duty
of support but merely on the decree of the divorce court.
In affirming the trial court's denial of reimbursement for community
funds used to pay state taxes for the husband's separate realty that pro-
duced community income and tax benefits for the community estate, the
appellate court in Hunt evidently concluded that the equities of the situa-
tion justified the trial court's conclusion. 101
Some courts continue to refer to imposing an equitable lien on prop-
erty to secure payment of a reimbursement award' 0 2 rather than recog-
nizing that the equitable lien already exists and giving it effect by fixing a
judgment lien on the security.10 3 In some other contexts the term "equi-
table lien" may have a different connotation. In Corpus Christi, for ex-
ample, the phrase may mean an equitable interest that is enforceable by
contempt, as when a divorce court declares that one spouse holds funds
as a trustee for the other spouse whose interest is secured by an equitable
lien on the trust property. 10 4
97. See id. at 568.
98. 931 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
99. 928 S.W.2d 782, 790 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ). The fact that
the duty to pay a child support obligation was imposed by court order seems beside the
point. The same can be said of any premarital judgment debt.
100. See Hunt, 952 S.W.2d at 568.
101. See id. at 569.
102. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1831, 1866-67 (1992).
103. See id.
104. See Votzmeyer v. Votzmeyer, Tex. Ct. App. Rep. T2-98-06-225, no. 13-96-265-CV




III. CONTROL AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. FAMILY CODE REVISION
Though there may be other codes or potential codes to which the time
of the Legislative Council might have been more productively expended,
the rearrangement and renumbering of all sections of Title 1 of the 1969
Family Code to three decimal points is not without merit. Though it is
said that the presiding officers of each legislative house made it clear that
this was a non-substantive revision, and no effort was made to amend it
either in committee or on the floor of the Legislature, the revision was
not in fact a non-substantive revision in the sense of the 1963 legislative
plan 0 5 under which a revised provision is read as a mere reenactment of
prior law. A recent judicial misunderstanding of that process is exempli-
fied by the decision in In re Garcia,10 6 where the Amarillo Court of Ap-
peals misinterpreted the Legislative Council's 1995 non-substantive
revision of Title 2 of the Family Code. In carrying out that revision, the
Legislative Council omitted the word "immediately" in section
11.03(a)(8) of the Family Code (now section 102.003(9)) as surplusage. 10 7
The appellate court mistakenly interpreted the omission as a substantive
change. 108 A similar alteration of language was made in the 1997 non-
substantive revision of section 5.22(a) of Title 1 (as section 3.102(a)) by
omission of the phrase "but not limited to" before the enumeration of
some types of community property subject to a spouse's sole manage-
ment.10 9 The omitted phrase was inserted in 1967 ex abundantia cautela,
but it was truly surplusage from the start. It is hoped that courts called on
to interpret the non-substantive revision will honor the Legislative Coun-
cil's intent.
In Delp & Delp v. Douglas" ° a couple brought a malpractice action
against a law firm that had represented them. Soon after the suit was
commenced, the husband filed for bankruptcy, but the wife was not a
party to that proceeding. A third person, who had purchased the hus-
band's claim from his trustee in bankruptcy, intervened in the couple's
suit against their attorneys to dismiss the husband's claim. The appellate
court held that the assignee lacked standing to dismiss the husband's
claim because the husband's claim for malpractice was not assignable,"'
even though the husband's claim was a part of his bankruptcy estate." 2
In further discussing the effect of the husband's bankruptcy on the mal-
105. See 1963 Texas Gen. Laws, 1152, ch. 448.
106. 944 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, no writ).
107. Section 11.03(a)(8) had provided that a suit affecting the parent-child relationship
might be filed by the person who had possession of the child if not less than six months
"immediately preceding" the filing of the petition. The word "immediately" was omitted
in the non-substantive revision.
108. See Garcia, 944 S.W.2d at 726-27.
109. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.22(a), 3.102(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
110. 948 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. granted).
111. See Delp, 988 S.W.2d at 489 (citing Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d
313, 318 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ ref'd)).
112. See id. at 490.
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practice suit, the court held that because the wife's claim was her solely
managed community property under old section 5.22(a), it was unaffected
by the husband's malpractice claim, if any. 113 The court, however, put
particular emphasis on the words "including but not limited to" in section
5.22(a) because it was argued that the wife's claim did not fit into any of
the types of property specifically enumerated there.114 The argument was
without foundation. The wife's claim for which she had filed suit in her
individual capacity was for personal injury for mental anguish, the recov-
ery of which would be either her separate property or her solely managed
community property.15
Old section 3.59, a remnant of the Divorce Act of 1841116 dealing with
temporary alimony, was also omitted from the 1997 statutory revision as
its substance had long since been incorporated in old section 3.58(c)(2)
(now section 6.502). 117 Following reiterated suggestion," 8 the Legislative
Council also gave a new home in the Probate Code 19 to the unnumbered
and untitled section, added at the 1971 session of the Legislature to deal
with the appointment of a guardian to manage a spouse's separate prop-
erty when he or she is missing on public service.
B. SPOUSAL DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
In Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bureau Underwriters Insurance Co. 120 the
Texas Supreme Court granted recovery for the wife against her insurer
for her fractional separate interest (shared with her husband's separate
interest) in a mobile home intentionally destroyed by her husband. The
right of recovery in the situation when the property destroyed is commu-
nity property was reserved for further consideration. 12 1 That issue was
before the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Chubb Lloyds Insurance Co.
v. Kizer.122 In the meantime, however, two panels of the federal Court of
Appeals had refused to reach the same conclusion for destruction of a
113. See id. at 493.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 494 (citing Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665-66 (Tex. 1989), as an
authority for possible recovery). The wife's claim was, of course, specifically covered by
the provisions of old sections 5.21 to 5.22(a)(3) and is covered by the provisions of the
present sections 3.101 to 3.102(a)(3) as "recoveries for personal injuries." See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 3.101-3.102(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
116. See 1840-1841 Tex. Gen. Laws 19, § 8, at 21.
117. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.502(2) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
118. See Recommendation of the Committee on Revision of Title I of the Family Code,
(on file with the SMU Law Review Association) approved by the Council of the Family
Law Section of the State Bar of Texas on May 10, 1996; Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary
on Title I of the Family Code, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 911, 1091-93 (1990); Joseph W. Mc
Knight, Commentary on Title 1 of the Family Code, 13 TEX. TECH L. REv. 611, 770-72
(1982); Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary on Title 1 of the Family Code, 5 TEX. TECH L.
REv. 281, 371-73 (1974); Joseph W. McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31, 43-44 (1972).
119. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 886-886F (Vernon 1998). There is a reference to
§ 886A in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.501(b) (1) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
120. 706 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986).
121. See id.
122. 943 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
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spouse's interest in community property in similar circumstances. But in
Travelers Co. v. Wolfe, 123 the Amarillo Court of Appeals had allowed re-
covery for the ex-wife's share in such a loss after the couple's divorce
decree had left the ex-spouses as tenants in common of their claim previ-
ously asserted against their insurer. In Chubb Lloyds the Fort Worth
court concluded that a division on divorce should not affect an ex-
spouse's subsequent right of recovery.124 Ordinarily that conclusion is
appropriate, but in concluding that the wife could not recover in Chubb
Lloyds the court assumed that the recovery would be shared by both
spouses as community property and overlooked the fact that the commu-
nity interest had been effectively partitioned by the divorce decree. 125 As
already pointed out,126 this is the fundamental conceptual difficulty in
dealing with such a community interest, though in this case the interest
had been divided while the suit was pending. Evidently, the Fort Worth
court did not perceive this point as overcoming the conceptual
difficulty. 127
A student essay has recently offered an analysis of various types of
fraud on the community estate. 128 Though the diction and terminology
are sometimes difficult to understand, the essay furnishes a good collec-
tion of authorities.
C. FORFEITURE OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
In Bennis v. Michigan129 the Supreme Court of the United States di-
vided five to four in holding that a Michigan law might constitutionally
allow forfeiture of a car jointly owned by a husband and wife and used by
the husband in violation of state law despite the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. Thus, an objection that might be
raised to the validity of spousal forfeiture laws is put aside. 130
D. DESIGNATION AND EXTENT OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY
Although in In re Moody13 1 the court was unable to conclude that a
123. 838 S.W.2d 708, 712 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ).
124. See Chubb Lloyds, 943 S.W.2d at 952.
125. See id. at 952.
126. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 41 Sw. L.J. 1, 20 (1987). By oversight, Shepard's Citator failed to note that citation of
Kulubis, and it may, therefore, have passed the attention of subsequent researchers.
127. See Chubb Lloyds, 943 S.W.2d at 952.
128. See Bradley L. Adams, Comment, The Doctrine of Fraud on the Community, 49
BAYLOR L. REV. 445 (1997).
129. 516 U.S. 442, 446 (1996), discussed in Shelly D. Whatley, Note, Baby, They Can
Seize Your Car: Forfeiture Laws and Taking Property from Innocent Victims in Bennis v.
Michigan, 34 Hous. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (1997).
130. Property oriented authorities involving Texas law on the point are modest. See
United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosa, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1540, 1555 (E.D. Tex. 1986);
Amrani-Khaldi v. State, 575 S.W.2d 667, 668-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ).
131. 77 B.R. 566 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987), affd, 862 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1989).
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transfer of a homestead had actually occurred and was therefore lost, it
was clear that the rural land claimed as the debtors' homestead in In re
Cole132 had been transferred by them to a family limited partnership
prior to their filing for bankruptcy. Thus, because the property was not
owned by the debtors when they sought bankruptcy, the debtors could
not claim the property as exempt from creditors' claims.133 It was irrele-
vant that the parties to the transfer were mistaken about the effects of
their acts. The debtors testified that they thought they had merely trans-
ferred the property to themselves.
In another bankruptcy case 134 the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals concluded that in a conversion from a Chapter 13 to a Chapter 7
bankruptcy the status of property at the date of initial filing determines
its homestead character rather than its condition at the time of conver-
sion to the Chapter 7 proceeding. When the debtors made their filing
under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, they owned two urban resi-
dential properties; one was their home and the other was rented to ten-
ants. The debtors claimed the first property as their homestead. In the
course of the Chapter 13 preceding, the debtors found it impossible to
meet the mortgage payments on the first property, allowed that property
to be foreclosed by the lienholder, and moved into the second house,
which they claimed as their homestead when they converted their Chap-
ter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case. Following In re Williamson135 which in-
volved similar facts dealing with a conversion from a Chapter 11 to a
Chapter 7 case, the federal appellate court concluded that the date of
initial filing is the time for characterizing exempt property because con-
version from one chapter to another does not create a new filing in bank-
ruptcy but is merely a shifting from one chapter of the Bankruptcy Code
to another for administration of the debtors' interests. 136 The court
thereby rejected the argument successfully made in the Eighth Circuit in
1984137 that policy concerns arising from administration under Chapter 13
justified departure from the plain language of the statute to produce a
different result. 138 The court also relied on the 1994 amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code 139 as showing subsequent Congressional intent with re-
spect to the issue at hand, though the amended statute did not apply to
the case before the court. 140
It is rare that leasehold residential property is claimed as a homestead
in bankruptcy. In In re Nagel'41 the bankrupt had entered into a residen-
tial lease contract for one year and agreed to pay (and did pay on going
132. 205 B.R. 382 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1997).
133. See id. at 385.
134. In re Sandoval, 103 F.3d 20, 22 (5th Cir. 1997).
135. 804 F.2d 1355, 1359 (5th Cir. 1986).
136. See Sandoval, 103 F.3d at 22.
137. See In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 1984).
138. See Sandoval, 103 F.3d at 23; 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1994).
139. See 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A) (1994).
140. See Sandoval, 103 F.3d at 23.
141. 216 B.R. 397 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997).
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into possession) a security deposit of $1,100, a pet deposit of $1,000, and
prepaid rent of $1,000. The bankrupt claimed the leasehold premises and
the three deposits as exempt property under the Texas homestead law.
Relying on Capitol Aggregates v. Walker,142 in which the principle was
announced that the rental of space in a mobile home park on which to
moor a mobile home constituted the basis for claiming the mobile home
as an improvement on homestead realty, the bankruptcy court concluded
that the leasehold interest constituted the debtor's homestead. 143 The
court then went on to hold that the deposits were also exempt as integral
parts of the leasehold interest.144 The court reasoned that just as all parts
of a non-exempt executory contract must be assumed or rejected 45 in
bankruptcy, the lease contract itself must also be exempt in toto or not
exempt in toto.146
E. LIENS ON HOMESTEADS
After a long and very costly campaign over many years, Texas's lending
institutions have finally achieved potential access to what has been de-
scribed as over one hundred billion dollars worth of homestead collateral.
By a comfortable majority of sixty-six percent of the votes cast, an
amendment to article XVI, section 50 of the Texas Constitution was
adopted to allow owners to mortgage their homes as security for a gen-
eral loan of money. 147 Thus, the limitation of the 1876 Constitution to
allow borrowing against a homestead only for purchase of the property
and its improvement or for payment of state taxes against it was repealed,
though with a myriad of special provisions for the protection of borrow-
ers and for the benefit of lenders. 148
The amendment also provided a new concept in mortgaging a home-
stead by which the lender can extend to the borrower-fee- simple-owner
of a homestead a series of loans against the collateral of the borrower's
home, but with foreclosure of the homestead for non-payment barred
during the borrower's lifetime unless the homeowner earlier abandons
the property as a homestead or agrees to a fixed term after which foreclo-
sure is allowed. 149 With some lack of felicity, as well as precision, this
device is referred to in lenders' parlance as a "reverse mortgage" because
the loan increases (due to the process of installment borrowing) rather
142. 448 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
143. See Nagel, 216 B.R. at 398. The court might have also relied on Johnston v. Mar-
tin, 81 Tex. 18, 21, 16 S.W. 550, 551 (1891), where occupancy of a five-year leasehold was
held to be a homestead.
144. See Nagel, 216 B.R. at 398.
145. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994).
146. Nagel, 216 B.R. at 399.
147. See TEX. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 50. The Texas Supreme Court has promulgated Rules
735 and 736 concerning judicial foreclosure proceedings against homestead property. See
TEX. R. Civ. P. 735, 736.
148. See TEX. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 50. The text of the new section occupies almost seven




than decreases (due to repayment) over a period of time.150 Ordinarily
such loans are not available to homeowners under the age of sixty-two.
During the period of the loan, the borrower continues to pay property
taxes, insurance premiums, and maintenance costs. Fees for such ar-
rangements are expensive, and the expense includes an initial high charge
in addition to monthly charges and mortgage insurance premiums. 15'
The initial charges sometimes exceed the actual amount of the loan.
Although the lenders' advertising of loans available under the amend-
ment have continued the campaign of advertising benefits to promote the
approval of the amendment, the extent of such lending is not yet appar-
ent, but it does not seem to be very great despite an unsuccessful effort to
get a headstart on the effective date of the amendment. 152
The Texas Attorney General provided a restricted interpretation of In-
wood North Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Harris,153 in reliance on
Boudreaux Civil Association v. Cox.154 It was concluded that a property
owners association might foreclose on a homestead only if the associa-
tion's lien attached prior to designation of the property as a homestead,
and the association's interest amounted to a restriction running with the
land.' 55
F. EXEMPT PERSONALTY
The bankrupt debtor in In re Juhasz156 sought to remove a non-
purchase money lien from a motor vehicle claimed as exempt as a tool of
trade under Property Code section 42.002(a)(4).157 The court rejected
the debtor's claim that the property was exempt as a tool of trade because
it was not particularly adapted for trade use.158 While some authorities
support the court's conclusion, others adhere to the older view that any
item sought to be treated as a tool of trade must simply be one used in
the trade but not peculiarly adapted to it.' 59 In presenting this section of
the Property Code to the Legislature in 1991 nothing was said about spe-
cial adaptation of a vehicle to trade use, but the draftsman explained that
exemption from creditors' claims extended to a motor vehicle other than
those vehicles defined as exempt under section 42.002(a)(9). 160 The ex-
emption was thus meant to liberalize rather than to restrict exemption of
150. An incrementally increasing loan is referred to by lenders as a "life-tenure loan,"
and if the loan is insured privately or by the Federal Home Loan Authority, the loan may
continue beyond the time when the value of the home is less than the amount of the loan.
151. See id.
152. See Op. TEX. ATr'y GEN. No. DM-452 (1997).
153. 736 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987).
154. 882 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
155. Op. TEX. ATr'y GEN. No. 97-019 (1997).
156. 208 B.R. 32 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997).
157. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(4) (Vernon 1994).
158. See Juhasz, 208 B.R. at 35 (citing In re Hincirik, 138 B.R. 835 (Bankr. N.D. Tex
1992); In re Weiss, 92 B.R. 677 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988)).
159. See Dwight Olds & Philip Palmer, Jr., Exempt Property in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN
TEXAS 23, 51-54 (Joseph W. McKnight, ed. 1963).




The Bankruptcy Code provides that a non-purchase-money lien may be
removed from certain exempt personalty of the debtor when the lien im-
pairs the exemption. 162 In In re Gonzales163 the debtor in bankruptcy
sought to remove a lien on household furniture exempt under section
42.002(a)(1). Although the creditor asserted that the lien was for
purchase money of the furniture, the creditor was unable to show the
extent of the lien and thus failed in his defense. 164
The bankrupt in In re Swift 65 brought an action against his former
employer for negligence in handling his retirement plan in such a manner
that it lost its exempt character and passed to his creditors in bankruptcy.
The defendant removed the action to the bankruptcy court, and the
debtor there asserted that his cause of action was exempt as a replace-
ment for the retirement plan that was itself exempt. The Fifth Circuit
appellate court so ruled 166 and also concluded that the cause of action
had accrued to the bankrupt before his bankruptcy petition was filed. 167
The cause of action thus became part of the bankrupt's estate to be
treated as exempt property under Property Code section 42.0021.
In In re Carmichael68 the exemption of an individual retirement ac-
count (IRA) was at issue solely under federal law because the bankrupt
debtor had chosen federal rather than state exemptions. 69 Bankruptcy
Code section 522(d)(10)(E) requires that in order to be exempt a debtor's
right to receive a payment under a "stock bonus, pension, profitsharing,
annuity or similar plan or contract" must entitle the owner to receive
payments at age fifty-nine and a half, though the owner may receive pay-
ments sooner by paying a penalty. 170 The court held that an IRA is a
"similar plan or contract" in the context of the statute and is therefore
exempt under the Bankruptcy Code.17'
IV. DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
A. DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
1. Special Appearance
In Dawson-Austin v. Austin 72 the wife, who denied any ties to Texas,
161. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 45 Sw. L. REV. 1831, 1857 (1992).
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994).
163. 206 B.R. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
164. See Gonzales, 206 B.R. at 135 (citing In re Tesmetges, 87 BR. 263, 270 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y.), affd., 95 B.R. 19 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988)).
165. 129 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 1997).
166. See id. at 802.
167. See id. at 798.
168. 100 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 1996).
169. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1994).
170. Id.
171. See Carmichael, 100 F.3d at 377; see also Gonzales, 206 B.R. at 1136.
172. 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 400 (1998). In a far easier case, the El Paso Court of Appeals
held that an ex-wife could not attain personal jurisdiction over her ex-husband in a post-
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filed pro se, as one instrument, a special appearance, a plea to the juris-
diction of the court, a plea in abatement, a motion to quash service of
citation, and subject to all of those, an original answer. All of the facts
except those of the special appearance were verified. Because of her fail-
ure to verify the facts of the special appearance as required, 173 and be-
cause the other pleas and motion were not specifically made subject to
her special appearance, the special appearance was promptly overruled,
and the court went on to hear argument on the motion to quash service of
citation, though the wife made a motion to continue the special-appear-
ance hearing. On the following day the wife filed a motion for reconsid-
eration and filed an amended special appearance to verify the facts
alleged, but the court denied the amended special appearance, and the
Dallas Court of Appeals sustained that conclusion. In reversing the rul-
ings of the lower courts, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that a prop-
erly amended special appearance must be filed before the party making it
invokes the judgment of the court on any matter other than jurisdic-
tion. 174 But the majority of the Court also concluded that other pleas
may be made in the same instrument as the special appearance without
waiving the special appearance and without an express statement that an-
other plea is made subject to the special appearance. 175 In so ruling, the
majority of the Court overruled Portland Savings & Loan Association v.
Bernstein.176 The effort to postpone the hearing that was made by the
motion for continuance did not constitute a plea for affirmative relief and
was, therefore, not contrary to the special appearance. 177
In Dawson-Austin the parties had no minor children and there were
only two claims before the court: the pleading for divorce and that for
division of the estate of the parties. Family Code section 7.001178 re-
quires, in effect, that when both parties are personally before the court,
those matters are not severable. The majority of the Court held that the
special appearance sustained in this case was not made with respect to the
power of the Court to grant the divorce but merely as to the division of
property, and granting the special appearance had that jurisdictional ef-
fect, as section 6.308179 (enacted in 1997) confirms. 180 In concluding that
divorce business dispute merely by showing that he was a shareholder of a Texas corpora-
tion that did not do business in Texas, made an annual visit to see his mother in El Paso,
and wrote one letter to her in his corporate capacity in 1994. See MacMorran v. Wood, No.
08-97-00024-CV, 1997 WL 763173 (Tex. App.-El Paso, Mar. 5, 1997, writ denied). In In re
Reinauer, 946 S.W.2d 853, 859 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, no writ), the dispute with re-
spect to personal jurisdiction to clarify a decree may have been irrelevant.
173. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a(1).
174. See Dawson-Austin, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 402.
175. See id.
176. 716 S.W.2d 532, 534-35 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); see Dawson-Austin, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 403.
177. See id. at 403-04.
178. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon Supp. 1998); see Joseph W. M'Knight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L. J. 1, 4 n.32 (1989).
179. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.308 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
180. See Dawson-Austin, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 405. An analogous jurisdictional situa-
tion is presented with regard to a parent-child dispute compulsorily joined in with a divorce
1068 [Vol. 51
HUSBAND AND WIFE
community property not before the court for division becomes a tenancy
of the former spouse on divorce, the Court in Busby v. Busby181 seemed
to recognize the exception of oversight, that is, that the issues of divorce
and division of property are severable when particular property is over-
looked and is thus not before the court. But the exception as to lack of
personal jurisdiction to divide property had not been authoritatively de-
fined, though it might be inferred from several decisions of the intermedi-
ate appellate courts182 and seems to have been in the minds of the
draftsmen of section 9.204183 when it was added to the Family Code in
1987.
In Dawson-Austin the Texas Supreme Court also rejected the domicili-
ary-husband's argument that the Texas situs of a stock certificate supplied
minimum contacts with Texas, which allowed exercise of power to deal
with the stock on divorce. 184 The husband's unilateral act of bringing the
stock certificate to Texas did not supply jurisdiction to make an adjudica-
tion concerning any moveable property. Texas realty 185 was not at issue.
2. Transfer
In Milton v. Herman186 a writ of mandamus was conditionally granted
to vacate an order of a statutory probate court to transfer a divorce and
parent-child proceeding for consolidation with a guardianship proceeding
before the probate court. In this instance a suit for divorce had been
brought by the wife against her incompetent husband, the guardianship of
whose person and property was administered under the jurisdiction of the
probate court. The appellate court held that because of the different na-
ture of divorce and parent-child proceedings from guardianship proceed-
ings generally, a great variety of matters would arise in relation to the
division of property and the best interest of the couple's child so that
transfer of the proceedings to the probate court was improper.187 The
case points up the continuing uneasy balance between the jurisdiction of
family courts and probate courts with respect to the custody and control
of minors and their property, as well as divorces involving wards of the
probate courts, and these matters require legislative attention.
petition under section 6.406(b) of the Family Code when the parent (not subject to the
personal jurisdiction of the court) has actual custody of the child in a foreign jurisdiction.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.406(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
181. 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970).
182. In Dawson-Austin, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 404, the Court cited Hoffman v. Hoffman,
821 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ), to which should be added Redus v.
Redus, 852 S.W. 2d 94, 95-96 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied), and Redus v. Redus,
794 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied). But see Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407,
410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (cited by the dissenting judges in Dawson-
Austin, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 410).
183. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.204 (Vernon Supp. 1998) (formerly TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 3.92 (Vernon 1995)).
184. See Dawson-Austin, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 407.
185. See id.
186. 947 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, n.w.h.).
187. See id. at 740; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 607-608 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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3. Abatement on Death of a Party
When death of a party to a divorce proceeding occurs prior to rendition
of judgment, the line dividing the jurisdiction of divorce courts from that
of probate courts is already well defined. Even though the divorce court
in Palomino v. Palomino1 s had already heard all the evidence concerning
division of property as well as matters concerning minor children, the
death of a party abated the suit for divorce.
The timing of events in Dearing v. Johnson1 89 was fundamentally differ-
ent. On May 28, 1997, the court heard the testimony of the parties and
orally granted a divorce. The husband died on July 13, and on July 30 the
judge signed the divorce decree without knowing that the husband had
died. The wife filed a motion for a new trial, and the motion was over-
ruled. There was no appeal. The wife then sought a declaratory judg-
ment that she was her husband's widow rather than a divorcee. The
court's dismissal of her suit was affirmed by the Texarkana Court of
Appeals. 190
4. Conduct of Trial
In two cases writs of mandamus were sought for diverse objectives.
The appellate court in In re Carter191 denied the writ for quashing a sub-
poena and alleged abuse of discretion in levying sanctions1 92 when the
petitioner failed to show the inadequacy of his legal remedy by appeal or,
in other instances, when the petitioner failed to lay a predicate for man-
damus-relief by showing that the trial court had refused the relief
sought. 193
In re Bland1 94 stands as a warning to any person involved in a divorce
who neglects to procure a signed judgment prior to remarrying, though
the ex-husband in that instance was lulled into a false sense of security by
the judge's waiver of the thirty days' delay for remarriage1 95 after rendi-
tion of an oral judgment of divorce. After the ex-husband had remarried
and had begun to build a house on property awarded to him by the di-
vorce court, his ex-wife refused to approve the judgment, and the court
ordered the parties to proceed to a jury trial on the merits. The ex-hus-
band petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to sign the
decree on the terms of the prior agreed settlement. The majority of the
court denied the petition,196 but Justice O'Connor would have stayed the
188. 960 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no writ). For an instance of death of a
party pending trial of a suit for clarification of a divorce decree, see Wilson v. Uzzel, 953
S.W.2d 384 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, n.w.h.).
189. 947 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, n.w.h.).
190. See id. at 642.
191. 958 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, n.w.h.).
192. See id. at 923.
193. See id. at 925.
194. 960 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
195. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.801(a), 6.802, 2.009(a)(6)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
196. See Bland, 960 S.W.2d at 124.
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trial in order to have further argument on the law in light of the ex-wife's
withdrawal from the settlement agreement on which the oral judgement
was based.197 Justice O'Connor recognized that in Ex parte Chunn198 her
court had granted a new trial in response to a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus after the trial court had rendered a judgment for divorce based on
a settlement agreement, and she registered her strong disagreement with
that holding.199
The situation in Baw v. Baw20 0 was very different from that in Bland
and was very ambiguous. Although the decree entered in Baw stated that
the parties agreed to the findings of the court, and their purported agree-
ment was borne out by language on the signature page of the decree,
their attorneys approved it "as to form only." The husband's testimony at
the trial had made it clear that he was not in agreement with the part of
the court's finding with respect to which he appealed. Though the appel-
late court ultimately affirmed the conclusion of the trial court, the appel-
late court made it clear that the husband had "not explicitly and
unmistakably" given his consent to the entire decree.20 1
In Childs v. Argenbright202 the sanctions complained of for abuse of
discovery in a divorce proceeding were largely, but not wholly, referable
to matters relating to the parent-child relationship, but the court's deci-
sion was not so limited. The trial court imposed monetary sanctions
against the wife's attorney (but not against his client) for the attorney's
failure to respond to discovery requests, his excessive objections to those
requests, and his use of objections for the purpose of delay.203 One of the
appellant's defenses of his conduct was that opposing counsel's interroga-
tories were excessive under the thirty-answer limit,20 4 but although he
complained of the number of the interrogatories, he had not attempted to
avail himself of a protective order. In response to the appellant's further
assertion that opposing counsel had failed to initiate a resolution of the
discovery dispute,205 the court suggested that either party may initiate
such an effort, but it is the responsibility of the movant for sanctions to
certify that the attempt had been made.20 6
In Fiore v. Fiore207 the appellate court considered the consequences of
197. See id. at 124-25.
198. 881 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1994, no writ).
199. See Bland, 960 S.W.2d at 124-25.
200. 949 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, n.w.h.).
201. Id. at 767.
202. 927 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, no writ).
203. The appellate court's reluctance to impose sanctions in Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 768,
may be termed jurisprudential, that is, the lack of assurance that an intermediate appellate
court in a common law system may feel toward recognizing the emergence of a new rule of
judge-made law not yet authoritatively addressed by the highest appellate court. For a
sanctions case involving an attorney's misconduct at the appellate level, see Johnson v.
Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 835, 840-41 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ requested).
204. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(5).
205. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(b)(7).
206. See Childs, 927 S.W.2d at 653; TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(b)(7).
207. 946 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
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the judge's dismissal of a juror. Twelve jurors had been empaneled in a
divorce case in which the husband's adultery was alleged. After hearing
the evidence for several days, one of the jurors reported to the judge that
she had become strongly biased against the husband because he closely
resembled her former son-in-law who had committed adultery while mar-
ried to her daughter. The judge, therefore, concluded that the juror was
disqualified, and he dismissed her because she could not be impartial to-
ward the husband. The husband immediately made a motion for a mis-
trial, which the court denied, and the trial continued with eleven jurors.
After the court had rendered judgment, the husband appealed, asserting
that he had been denied his constitutional right to trial by jury. The Gov-
ernment Code provides that "[a] person is disqualified to serve as a petit
juror . . . if he . . . has a bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, a
party .... ",208 The husband argued that the juror was nonetheless not
rendered disabled within the meaning of the Texas Constitution 20 9 or the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.210 Disability from sitting as a juror has
been long equated to physical or mental incapacity.211 The dismissal of a
juror who is not disabled is an abuse of the court's discretion if there is no
agreement of the parties to proceed with fewer jurors. Thus, the trial
court committed reversible error.2 12
5. Bill of Review
At the 1997 Session the Legislature passed an amendment to the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code to codify and amend the law of equitable
bills of review.213 The Governor vetoed the bill as unwise and unconsti-
tutional for unspecified reasons. 214 An effort toward reform is likely to
be renewed and refined.
6. Unappealable Orders
In Normand v. Fox215 the trial court found that numerous telephone
calls made by a man to his former wife constituted family violence requir-
ing a protective order, and the husband appealed. The Waco Court of
Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to review such an order because it
208. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 62.105(4) (Vernon Supp. 1998). Section 62.201 provides
that in a district court a civil jury is composed of twelve persons unless the parties agree to
fewer.
209. The Texas Constitution requires that a district court jury consist of twelve mem-
bers unless not more than three jurors die or are "disabled from sitting." TEX. CONST. art.
V, § 13.
210. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 292.
211. See Houston & Texas Cent. Ry. v. Walker, 56 Tex. 331 (1882).
212. See Fiore, 946 S.W.2d at 438.
213. See H. B. 506, adding chapter 67 to the Civil Practice & Remedies Code; Legisla-
tive Update, 60 Tex. Bar J. 813 (1997).
214. The Governor's veto message (41-2687) of June 20, 1997 said that the bill was
"contrary to U.S. Supreme Court precedent and unwisely changes the common law statute
of limitations on bills of review." Veto Message of Gov. Bush, Tex. H.B. 506, 75th Leg.,
R.S. (1997).
215. 940 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
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was not the sort of order that could be reviewed and the order did not
seem to qualify as a final order.216 The court nevertheless indicated some
contrary authority as to the finality of such orders, 217 but a dissenting
judge concluded that the order was a final one.218 The court noted, how-
ever, that a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy to challenge such
orders not subject to appeal. 219 But sensing undesirable results in that
approach, the court suggested the amendment of the Family Code to pro-
vide for review of protective orders. 220
7. Interim Attorney's Fees
In Keim v. Anderson221 the husband sued his wife for divorce. The wife
hired an attorney to represent her, and the court ordered the husband to
pay $1,050 for the wife's attorney's fees in connection with discovery and
further interim attorney's fees of $5,000 to be paid in installments of
$1,000. The husband made only one installment payment. The wife's
counsel then withdrew, and the wife hired other counsel. Several days
later the parties entered into a written agreement concerning division of
property and matters concerning their minor children, and each party
agreed to "pay debts incurred by them during the separation," 222 but
debts incurred in the litigation were not specifically mentioned apart
from the husband's agreement to pay the wife's current attorney $3,500.
The trial court accepted the parties' agreement, and the divorce was
granted. Later the same day the wife's prior attorney filed a plea in inter-
vention to claim her interim attorney's fees, and the trial court ordered
inclusion of the unpaid fees of $4,000 as part of the divorce decree. The
husband appealed the inclusion of the additional attorney's fees, which at
the date of the hearing amounted $5,750.223 In a carefully reasoned opin-
ion the appellate court concluded that the trial court had rendered a final
judgment orally and that the intervention of the wife's prior attorney was
improperly considered after judgment was rendered. 224 The court further
held, however, that the case should be reversed and remanded because
the trial court could not have altered the settlement agreement of the
parties but should have an opportunity to accept the agreement as stipu-
lated, or to set aside the agreement in order to consider the intervention,
or to reject the agreement on the ground that it did not constitute a just
and right division.225 Although it was not argued that a plea in interven-
tion was really necessary (apart from the effects of the prior attorney's
withdrawal), one wonders how the trial court should have responded to a
216. See id. at 402-03.
217. See id. at 403-04.
218. See id. at 404-05 (Vance, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 404.
220. See id. at 404 n.6.
221. 943 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no writ).
222. Id. at 940.
223. Just how the arithmetical calculation was arrived at is not clear.
224. See id. at 943.
225. See id. at 946.
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mere motion by the prior attorney to insert provisions in the judgment
concerning her fees that had been omitted by oversight. Appellate courts
in many instances have treated attorneys as parties for the purpose of
awarding fees,226 and in this instance the court had made orders relating
to the prior attorney, and those orders had not been altered or vacated.2 27
B. PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
1. Mediation
Although simple property settlements without judicial encouragement
continue to be negotiated and litigated in the aftermath of divorce, an
order to mediate has become an increasingly popular judicial means of
prompting parties to reach a mutually agreeable solution of spousal disa-
greement in the context of divorce. Court-ordered mediation under
chapter 154 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is thus urged upon
litigants so that they can not only commence talks but also make actual
progress toward the settlement of disputes. Within the last decade a re-
markably large body of appellate precedent has been developed through
judicial efforts to shift the venue of dispute from courtrooms to mediation
chambers,228 although many of the disputes that have arisen in civil con-
texts have not been oriented to family law. In In re Ames229 the Amarillo
Court of Appeals attempted to meld the provisions of chapter 154 with
section 3.631(a) (now 7.001(a)) of the Family Code to produce a binding
settlement in a family dispute,230 but in subsequent instances when the
court-ordered mediated settlement has been repudiated by one party
before judgement, as in Cary v. Cary,231 the courts have allowed with-
drawal under section 7.001(a).232 Otherwise, as the court said in Cary,
court-ordered mediation would be transformed into binding arbitra-
tion.233 Although the court there went on to say that an action for breach
of contract still lies against the withdrawing party, 234 one wonders what
practical value such causes are likely to produce in family litigation.
226. See Joseph W. McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 413, 459 n.274 (1976), for an old collection of cases to which might be added a
recent instance in which attorney's fees were awarded to the wife's attorneys without for-
mal intervention. See In re Hudson, 107 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 1997). The award of attorney's
fees was treated as binding in the ex-husband's subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. See
also Joseph W. M'Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
45 Sw. L.J. 415, 438 (1991), discussing Rossen v. Rossen, 792 S.W.2d 277, 278-79 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
227. See Keim, 943 S.W.2d at 945-46.
228. See id.
229. 860 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ). For a discussion of this
case, see Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 47 SMU L. REV. 1161, 1188-89 (1994).
230. See Ames, 860 S.W.2d at 592-93.
231. 894 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
232. See, e.g., id. at 112.




In Alvarez v. Reiser235 the Eastland Court of Appeals enforced a medi-
ated divorce settlement agreement that was by its terms irrevocable but
was nevertheless repudiated by the wife prior to judgment. The agree-
ment in issue was entered into under Family Code section 153.0071(f), 236
which then made such agreements applicable to family disputes beyond
the subject matter of the parent-child relationship. That section was re-
pealed in 1997 and replaced with Family Code section 6.602, which pro-
vides in section 6.602(a)(1) that the mediated settlement is not subject to
revocation if the agreement "provides in a separate paragraph that the
agreement is not subject to revocation. '237 In apparent response to
Spinks v. Spinks,2 38 an unsuccessful attempt to enforce an agreement af-
fecting the parent-child relationship that had not complied with the un-
derlining as well as capitalization requirements of section 153.0071(e), the
new provisions of section 6.602(b) do not require that the irrevocability
provision of the agreement not to revoke be capitalized or underlined.2 39
Though the dispute in Dennis v. Smith240 arose under section 153.0071
and solely concerned the parent-child relationship, it is nonetheless sug-
gestive of results that might ensue under a chapter 6 mediation agree-
ment. The Houston First District Court of Appeals held that by the
language of the statute the trial court may "recommend" but can not re-
quire that parents resort to alternative dispute resolution before litigating
enforcement or modification of the terms of their agreement incorpo-
rated in the divorce decree.2 41
2. Terms of Property Settlement Agreements
In In re Thornburg42 the parties had filed a written (Rule 11) settle-
ment of all claims between them in their divorce, and both agreed not to
appeal from the order of the court based on their settlement, which in-
cluded an order that the husband turn over certain property to his wife.
The husband appealed that order. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held
that the agreement was binding and would have been binding even if the
husband had tried to withdraw from it before it was filed with the
court, 243 though he had not done so. The court sanctioned the husband
for filing a frivolous appeal. 244
The property settlement agreement at issue in Wilson v. Uzze1245 was
negotiated by the parties to a 1977 divorce and was incorporated in the
235. 958 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, writ requested).
236. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. 153.0071(f) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
237. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
238. 939 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1997, no writ).
239. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602(b)(1).
240. 962 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App.-Houston f[st Dist.] 1997, no pet. h.).
241. See id. at 74. Justice O'Connor dissented on other aspects of the case but not on
this one.
242. 946 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, no writ).
243. See id. at 99.
244. See id.
245. 953 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, n.w.h.).
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decree. The couple had agreed to division of the husband's pension bene-
fits in terms of percentages of the amount received on retirement. When
the ex-husband retired in 1993, the ex-wife was paid a portion of his ben-
efits as calculated according to the decree. After a while the ex-husband
realized that the formula agreed to by the parties was inconsistent with
prevailing principles of judicial division of pension interests and brought
suit for alleged overpayment received by his ex-wife and clarification of
the decree. Although the trial court may have lacked the power to make
the division as agreed by the parties, in that a part of the husband's sepa-
rate entitlement was included in payments to the ex-wife, the appellate
court held that the unappealed order incorporating the settlement agree-
ment must nevertheless stand under the rule of res judicata and was,
therefore, not subject to revision. 246 But even if there had been grounds
for clarification, the court said that the decree could not have been clari-
fied in this instance because the ex-husband died prior to judgment in this
suit.2 47 A retrospective clarification could not be granted because the ex-
husband's benefits ceased with his death, and a clarifying order could not
be made that would be enforceable by contempt under the statute. 248
The court evidently concluded that the statute for clarification would thus
preclude any relief against the ex-wife for overpayment provided that
such an overpayment could be shown under an improperly broad final
judgment.
Resolution of the ex-spouses' dispute in Hurley v. Hurley2 49 was also
grounded in an analysis of their property settlement agreement, which
gave the ex-wife a percentage in value of the ex-husband's retirement
benefits if and when received. The suit for clarification of the 1984 di-
vorce decree was brought soon after the ex-husband's retirement. Again,
the court concluded that the spouses' agreement might deprive either or
both of them of separate property, though that result was beyond the
divorce court's power in dividing the marital property.250 Although the
ex-husband argued that the value of his pension interest at the time of
divorce was controlling, the agreement stated that the ex-wife should
have one-half of the benefits if and when received, and the ex-wife's enti-
tlement to death benefits paid in relation to the ex-husband were dealt
with in the same way. The court is required to enforce the decree as
written 251 without modification and, as written, the decree incorporated
the agreement of the parties which indicated that division of retirement
benefits would be controlled by their value at the time of receipt by the
pensioner.
In Wiley v. Sclafani252 the property settlement agreement of the parties
246. See id. at 390-91 (citing Baxter v. Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1990)).
247. See id. at 391.
248. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
249. 960 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet. h.).
250. See id. at 289 (citing Baxter v. Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761, 762-63 (Tex. 1990)).
251. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.006 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
252. 943 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
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incident to their 1979 divorce provided that the husband would be
awarded a community duplex subject to the right of the wife to a fixed
part of the income and a right to share in a certain fraction of the net
proceeds of sale. In 1986 the ex-wife filed a petition to rescind the con-
tract and to appoint a receiver to sell the duplex. The court did not re-
spond to the first request but appointed the receiver, and although the
parties then sought to sell the property, they were unable to do so. In late
1987 the ex-wife again sought appointment of a receiver to sell the prop-
erty, and a receiver was appointed by agreement of the parties. In early
1992 the amicable relations of the parties deteriorated and much confu-
sion ensued as to sale of the property and maintaining the receivership. 253
In 1993 the receiver sought to abate the receivership, but the court denied
that and other motions. In 1994 the ex-husband filed for relief under
chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, but the receiver was nonetheless au-
thorized by the Texas court to continue to collect rents from the property
and to commence proceedings to sell it. In 1995 the court granted the ex-
husband's motion for summary judgement in the ex-wife's 1986 suit for
appointment of a receiver on the ground that the ex-wife's claims were
barred under section 3.71 of the Family Code (now section 9.006).254 The
court ultimately vacated the receivership and thus deprived the receiver
and his counsel of their fees because the receivership was deemed void ab
initio, but they were nonetheless awarded modest costs against the ex-
husband. 255 The receiver's unsuccessful appeal demonstrates some of the
perils of receivership in such casual and disorderly post-divorce
proceedings.
C. MAKING THE DIVISION
2 5 6
In making a "just and right" division of "the estate of the parties"
under section 7.001257 the court must not encroach on separate property
of one of the spouses, though occupancy of a separate homestead may be
allowed for the benefit of minor children,2 58 and a lien may be fixed upon
separate realty as security for benefits received by that property, reim-
bursed to the other spouse. 259 Certain property interests may also be
253. An appeal from the court's order denying the relief sought was dismissed for want
of jurisdiction. See Sclafani v. Sclafani, 870 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1993, writ denied), commented on in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and
Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REV. 1225, 1270 (1995).
254. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.006 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
255. See Wiley, 943 S.W.2d at 111; TEX. R. Civ. P. 141.
256. For an incisive general introduction to this subject, see Barbara Anne Kazen,
Division of Property at the Time of Divorce, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 417 (1997). As an
introduction it replaces the rather primitive analysis of Joseph W. McKnight, Division of
Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413 (1976), and its rather dated
supplement. See Joseph W. McKnight, How to Deal with Texas Matrimonial Property on
Divorce, once included in PRENTICE-HALL Divorce Taxation Service [1 551] (1983).
257. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
258. See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 141-42 (Tex. 1977).
259. See Heggen v. Pemelton, 836 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1992); McGoodwin v.
McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1984).
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precluded from division under federal law. Federal veterans' disability
benefits fall under this exclusion. In In re Reinauer260 by a divorce decree
entered in 1979, the wife was awarded a share of the husband's military
retirement benefits when he should retire. In 1992 the husband was re-
tired because of disabilities, and after waiving a portion of his service
retirement benefits, he began receiving federal veterans' disability bene-
fits. 261 The ex-wife then sought a determination of the scope of the 1979
decree with respect to the ex-husband's benefits. The Amarillo Court of
Appeals held that insofar as the ex-husband was entitled to disability pay-
ments from the federal Department of Veteran Affairs, the trial court's
decree could not alter them.262
Section 7.001 speaks only of division of "the estate of the parties,"
which, of course, means assets. Although there is no statutory authority
to direct payment of debts, divorce courts have long exercised that au-
thority as an aspect of making a just and right division of property. One
or both spouses will always be personally liable for any debt arising dur-
ing their marriage, either as a principal or as the agent of the other
spouse. But the divorce court cannot deprive a creditor of a right to en-
force a debt except for reasons stemming from the formation of the debt
itself.2 63 If a spouse incurs liability, that liability is not affected by the
divorce unless the debt is paid or is barred from collection by operation
of law. In Johnson v. Johnson264 the husband objected on appeal to his
being ordered to pay a debt of an amount beyond the value of community
assets awarded to him. Thus, the liability would fall on his present and
future separate property. The personal liability for the debt is not clearly
discussed, but it appears that it was a mutual obligation incurred by the
spouses in buying a car, which was awarded by the court to the wife,
whereas the husband alone was ordered to pay the remaining liability. It
further appears that without her consent, the husband had sold the wife's
separate car for which no debt was owed. Thus, in this instance, the equi-
ties supported the court's order that the husband pay the obligation, and
he may have been at least jointly liable for payment already.265 If the ex-
wife should have to pay the debt, she could recover compensation from
her ex-husband on the basis of the divorce court's order.266
In Winkle v. Winkle,267 the trial court also required the husband to exe-
260. 946 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, writ denied).
261. He therefore began to receive benefits under 38 U.S.C. §§ 5305, 3101 et seq.
(1994).
262. See Reinauer, 946 S.W.2d at 857-58 (citing, inter alia, Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d
192 (Tex. 1981), and Ex parte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 1979)).
263. See Broadway Drug Store v. Trowbridge, 435 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ).
264. 948 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ requested).
265. See id. at 838.
266. See Cooper v. Dalton, 581 S.W.2d 219, 221-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, no writ); Walker v. Walker, 527 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975,
no writ).
267. 951 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied); see supra notes 40-
43, 92-95 and accompanying text.
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cute what was called a vendor's lien on his separate property and commu-
nity property awarded to him for securing a money judgment awarded to
the wife in order to make an equitable division of the property. The ap-
pellate court denied the trial court's power to impose a lien for this pur-
pose on the separate property of the husband not benefitted by the sum
expended. 268
A further lien was said to have been imposed by the divorce court on
"the separate corporation" of the husband for efforts of the husband ex-
pended in enhancing its value. One wonders how such a lien was im-
posed. In Jensen v. Jensen269 the Texas Supreme Court said that a money
judgment should be awarded to the other spouse for such purposes rather
than purporting to put a lien on separate shares of stock in a corporation
whose value is enhanced by expenditure of a community effort of the
owner-spouse.
The principal issue in Winkle, however, was one of fact: whether the
husband had given false or misleading information to federal customs au-
thorities in relation to the wife's importing business that caused fines to
be imposed against her for which the husband should indemnity her. As
time went on, however, the differences between the spouses became a
struggle to control the business while they went their separate ways ro-
mantically. The court found that the record did not support the alleged
accusations of customs-informing, and hence the imposition of a lien
against the husband's separate property to secure payment of the indem-
nity was unwarranted factually as well as legally improper.270 These accu-
sations were in the nature of allegations of tortious wrongs, though just
how the matter was pleaded is not indicated in the report, and argument
at the trial seems to have focused on division of assets rather than analy-
sis of that issue. 271
In McMann v. McMann 272 the ex-husband appealed from his former
wife's unsuccessful effort to enforce a property settlement agreement.
Though the agreement mandated that attorney's fees would be awarded
only to the successful litigant, the trial court awarded attorney's fees to
the ex-wife and awarded none to the ex-husband. The appellate court
held that the terms of the agreement must prevail,273 and statutory re-
quirements for asserting claims under a statute are beside the point when
268. See Winkle, 951 S.W.2d at 87.
269. 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1984). The appellate court also denied the power of the
divorce court to put a lien on separate property of the husband unrelated to his corporate
interest to secure the award of reimbursement for community effort expended in favor of
the separate corporate interest. See Winkle, 951 S.W.2d at 88. Inept as the divorce court's
efforts may have been in Winkle in dealing with various reimbursement problems, they
seem relatively competent when compared to those of the trial court in In re Cassel, No.
07-96-0268-CV, 1997 WL 260099 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, May 19, 1997, n.w.h.).
270. See Winkle, 951 S.W.2d at 87.
271. See id. at 84-85.
272. 942 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
273. See id. at 97-98.
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a claim is based on an agreement.2 74
As in writing contracts, in the preparation of judgments great attention
to the choice of words is required, but none of us can foresee all eventual-
ities. In Stanley v. Riney2 75 a suit was brought as a consequence of an
annulment to seek division of undivided community property. But for
the specific provisions of section 9.201 of the Family Code, it might have
been effectively argued that because a decree of annulment dissolves a
marriage ab initio, there is no property to divide. That section, however,
provides otherwise.276 The trial court's decree had provided that "no
community property was accumulated during the marriage other than
personal effects ... [and] that each party hereto take as his or her sepa-
rate property all such property as is presently in his or her possession. '2 77
Thus, each party was awarded personal effects only. Among the wife's
possessions was a winning lottery ticket. In the ex-husband's suit for a
division of the property that was undivided on annulment, the trial court
concluded that the lottery ticket did not constitute "personal effects" and
that the lottery ticket and its proceeds were therefore undivided. The
Tyler appellate court agreed.2 78
In Soto v. Soto2 79 in 1985 the trial court had awarded the husband all
real and personal property in his "possession" and awarded the wife
nothing. In 1988 the ex-wife brought suit for partition of property undi-
vided in the decree. The ex-wife approved the decree as to form only.
Thus, the decree was not a consent decree, and it was subject to interpre-
tation by the law of judgments rather than the law of contracts and intent
of the parties was therefore irrelevant. The court's decree in favor of the
husband was in these terms: "All real and personal property in Respon-
dent's [husband's] possession. All clothing, jewelry, and other personal
effects in the possession of or subject to the control of Respondent [hus-
band]. 280 The appellate court made this observation: "We thus cannot
determine whether the court awarded Husband all real estate plus the
personal property in his possession or all real property in his possession
and all personal property in his possession. '28 1
Although it seems clear that the trial court meant the latter and also in-
cluded in its award to the husband "[a]ll clothing, jewelry and other per-
sonal effects" which might be subject to his control if not in his
possession,282 the appellate court went on to say that the error of ambigu-
ity, if any, was harmless because the trial court found that the husband
274. See id. at 97 (complying with TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 38.001-.002
(Vernon 1988)).
275. No. 12-97-00056-CV, 1998 WL 35173 (Tex. App.-Tyler, Jan. 29, 1998, no pet. h.).
276. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.201 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
277. Stanley, 1998 WL 35173, at *2.
278. See id.
279. 936 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
280. Id. at 340.




was in actual possession and control of all of the realty in issue.283 Thus,
there was no undisposed realty to divide as the ex-wife had alleged.
The appellate court went on to say that the ex-wife also challenged the
trial court's finding that she had failed to bring suit within two years as
required by section 3.90(c) of the Family Code (now section 9.202), but
that challenge lacked substance and was therefore beside the point.
284
The meaning of the statute of limitation is, however, perhaps worthy of
comment. The provisions of sections 9.201 to 9.204, originally enacted in
1987, provide that a claimant for division of undivided assets must bring
suit within two years of discovering that the other ex-spouse has unequiv-
ocally repudiated the claimant's interest.285 But if one of the parties to
the divorce or annulment dies before any proceeding for division is
brought or fails to bring suit within two years of the discovery of repudia-
tion, the property is still held as a tenancy in common subject to equal
partition.286
In Wilde v. Murchie287 the Texas Supreme Court held that interpreta-
tion of a judgment may require examination of the record of the trial, as
well as the language of the decree. The 1968 divorce decree awarded the
community home to the husband; the wife received a money-judgment
"as her equity in the community home," 288 and a lien was put on all of the
husband's real and personal property for the payment of the judgment.
The ex-husband did not pay the judgment debt. The ex-wife abstracted
her judgment in July, 1968 and reabstracted it in July, 1978 but did not
further abstract it until October, 1988. Thus, the lien was lost under the
statute then in effect.289 On the ex-husband's death in 1992 the home
passed to his devisee who later brought suit for a declaratory judgment as
to her title. The trial court's judgment in favor of the devisee was re-
versed by the Corpus Christi Court of Appeal's holding that the lack of
express language of divestiture to the home caused at least one-half of
the title to remain in the ex-wife. The Texas Supreme Court found this
approach to interpretation of the judgment erroneous.290 Rather, the
Court said, "[l]ike other judgments, courts are to construe divorce de-
crees as a whole.., giving effect to all that is written." 291 Although there
was no express divestiture of the wife's interest in the home, "the decree
liquidated her equity interest in the property and stipulated that [the hus-
band] assume all existing debts on the property. '' 292 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the decree was meant to award the home solely to the
283. See id.
284. See id. at 343.
285. See TEX. FAM. COoE ANN. §§ 9.201-9.204 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
286. See id.
287. 949 S.W.2d 331, 332-33 (Tex. 1997).
288. Id. at 332.
289. See id. at 333 (citing Constance v. Constance, 544 S.W.2d 659, 660 (Tex. 1976)).
290. See id. at 332.




husband.293 This interpretation was borne out by the wife's original peti-
tion for divorce in which she stated that her husband "may have the
house to do with as he pleases. '294 Clear language in the decree to divest
the wife's interest or a clear statement of the husband's sole interest
would have obviated this dispute.
D. MAINTENANCE FOR AN Ex-SPOUSE
Not only in the 1995 statutory amendment to section 8.001295 (provid-
ing for an award for ex-spousal maintenance) but in all instances of statu-
tory amendment, the provision of the enacting statute as to the effective
date of the statute must be carefully considered in any suit affected by the
statute. Two appellate courts have considered the effective date provision
of the amendment to be applied "only to an action filed on or after"
September 1, 1995.296 The question was whether a counter-petition filed
or amended after the effective date in response to a petition filed before
the effective date is "an action" within the terms of the statute. In Ex
parte Casey2 9 7 the husband's petition for divorce was filed on August 30,
1995. The wife asserted that she was not served and had no notice of the
pending suit until after the effective date of the amendment. She filed
her counter-petition for divorce on October 20, 1995, and the court
granted her ex-spousal maintenance. The ex-husband refused to pay as
ordered and was committed to jail for contempt of the order. 298 The hus-
band in Crenshaw v. Crenshaw299 filed his suit for divorce one month
before the effective date of the ex-spousal maintenance statute, and his
wife filed a counter-petition a week later. She amended her counter-peti-
tion six days after the statute became effective and sought ex-spousal
maintenance. In Ex parte Casey300 the Fourteenth District Court of Ap-
peals, relying on rule 97,301 held that Texas counter-claims are not per-
missive and therefore follow the date of the original suit.30 2 The court
also concluded that it was the obvious intention of the Legislature, as
expressed in plain language, to allow the first filing to control the applica-
bility of the statute.30 3 In Crenshaw the San Antonio court also held that
the counter-claim is not an action and followed the holding of the Hous-
293. See id.
294. Id. The Court also said that the subsequent conduct of the parties is relevant to
the construction of an ambiguous judgment and that the lapse of twenty-four years before
the ex-wife's assertion of a half-interest in the property supported its construction of the
decree. See id.
295. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.001 (Vernon Supp. 1998) (originally TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 3.9601 (Vernon Supp. 1997)).
296. See 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3543, ch. 655, § 10.02, at 3577.
297. 944 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).
298. See id. at 19.
299. 957 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet. h.).
300. 944 S.W.2d at 20-21.
301. TEX. R. Civ. P. 97.
302. See Casey, 944 S.W.2d at 20.
303. See id. at 21.
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ton court. 304 A contrary view has nevertheless been expressed: a
counter-petition is an original suit, and its filing after the effective date of
the statute should govern the applicability of the statute to the counter-
petition because it was in the counter-suit that maintenance was
sought.305 The view has also been expressed that the ex-spousal mainte-
nance provision could face a constitutional attack, 30 6 though no such at-
tack has yet materialized. A successful constitutional challenge seems
very unlikely.
E. EFFECTS OF BANKRUPTCY
Although resort to bankruptcy will not discharge liability for support
obligations, that remedy continues to be sought.307 In In re Swate,30 8 for
example, the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a lump sum
award for future support of the ex-wife as provided by the parties in an
agreement incident to divorce and later reduced to a judgment debt in a
state court proceeding was not a debt that would be discharged in the ex-
husband's bankruptcy.30 9 In this instance the ex-husband twice sought
recourse to the Bankruptcy Court for relief from the debt, and on the
second occasion the court relied on the res judicata effect of the prior
bankruptcy decree that preceded the state court's judgment reducing the
support order to a judgment debt.310 Although the ex-husband presented
a number of ingenious arguments to support his position, they were all
refuted by the court. The court said that because both ex-spouses were
parties to both bankruptcy proceedings, a mutual estoppel of the parties
operated to preclude either party from relitigating issues previously
adjudicated.311
In In re Chunn312 the Fifth Circuit court for the first time resolved the
issue of whether an order granting relief from a bankruptcy court's auto-
matic stay is a final and appealable order. In this instance the husband
had appealed from some aspects of a Texas divorce decree and then filed
suit for bankruptcy. The state court had ordered the husband to make
home mortgage payments as part of his child-support obligation, and his
non-payment prompted his ex-wife to move for contempt of the state
court's order. The wife then sought to lift the automatic stay in the bank-
304. See Crenshaw, 957 S.W.2d at 172.
305. See Kazen, supra note 256, at 438-39.
306. See Denise Causey Haugen, Comment, Texas and Alimony: The Possibility of
Constitutional Attack, 34 Hous. L. REV. 477 (1997).
307. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994) precludes discharge of support obligations, and 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (1994) excepts some other claims related to property settlement agree-
ments. See Benice B. Donald & Jennie D. Latta, The Dischargeability of Property Settle-
ments and Hold Harmless Agreements in Bankruptcy: An Overview of § 523(a)(15), 31
FAM. L. Q. 409 (1997); Richard H. W. Maloy, Using Bankruptcy Court to Modify Domestic
Relations Decrees: Problems Created by § 523(a) (15), 13 FAM. L. 0. 433 (1997).
308. 99 F.3d 1282 (5th Cir. 1996).
309. See id. at 1286.
310. See id. at 1285-86.
311. See id. at 1290.
312. 106 F.3d 1239 (5th Cir. 1997).
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ruptcy court so that the state court's order could be enforced. 313 The
bankruptcy court lifted the stay. The Fifth Circuit court held that the
husband could appeal the bankruptcy court's order.314 The appellate
court also held that the bankruptcy court had properly lifted the stay for
the enforcement of the child-support order.315
A somewhat different dispute was before the bankruptcy court in In re
Topper.316 At the time of the couple's 1994 divorce the husband had not
divulged the existence of certain community corporate shares in his in-
ventory of community property in the hope that he could defraud his wife
of her community interest in them. The divorce decree did not specifi-
cally divide the shares but provided that any community property not
specifically divided would be equally divided between the parties. The
ex-wife later discovered the existence of the shares and transferred her
interest in them to a third person. In the ex-husband's later bankruptcy
proceeding the transferee sought the shares transferred to him. In mak-
ing the order requested, the bankruptcy court held that although the
bankrupt claimed ownership of the shares, the ex-wife's interest as de-
fined in the decree was not a part of the bankrupt's estate.317 The court
analogized the stock (once held in the name of the bankrupt-husband) to
a trust-property held by a bankrupt-trustee. 318
F. OTHER POST-DIVORCE DISPUTES
Sever v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. 319 involved a contest
over proceeds of a life insurance policy. The husband contracted for the
insurance policy during marriage and named his wife as the beneficiary.
When the couple was divorced, the court awarded the policy to the hus-
band and ordered him to maintain a policy of life insurance in the amount
of $50,000 on behalf of his only child as long as he had an obligation to
pay for the child's support. After the divorce the ex-husband told his
insurance agent that he did not desire to change the designation of the
policy's beneficiary, but he made no further arrangements concerning the
policy. The child was still a minor when the father died. The appellate
court held that the ex-wife could not take as beneficiary of the policy
because the insured ex-husband had not redesignated her as beneficiary
in accordance with section 9.301 (formerly 3.632) of the Family Code, 320
313. See Ex parte Chunn, 933 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no
writ). Because the court's order (for which the ex-husband was confined for contempt of
court) required him to make future payments that were not yet due, his writ of habeas
corpus was granted, and he was released from confinement. The same result can be antici-
pated in response to a similar order for confinement for failure to pay future maintenance
for an ex-spouse.
314. See Chunn, 933 F.3d at 535.
315. See id. at 535 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)).
316. 212 B.R. 255 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997).
317. See id. at 257.
318. See id. at 258 (citing In re Unicorn Computer Corp., 13 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1994)).
319. 944 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, writ denied).
320. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.301 (West Supp. 1998).
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and the information supplied to the insurance agent was irrelevant in sat-
isfying compliance with the statute.321 Because the insured ex-husband
had not named an alternate beneficiary, the proceeds were payable to his
estate, though a constructive trust of $50,000 was imposed on the pro-
ceeds of the policy in favor of the decedent's minor child.
322
At the 1997 legislative session the effect of Probate Code section 481
on non-terminable powers of attorney was altered by the enactment of
section 485A, which provides that on divorce or annulment of a principal-
spouse and an agent-spouse, a power of attorney between them is
terminated. 323
Robinson v. Robinson324 dealt with the effects of efforts of former
spouses toward making contractual post-divorce adjustment in liability
under a property settlement agreement. Much of the dispute turned on
the proof of facts alleged by each former spouse, but the result is instruc-
tive in that it serves as a warning against imprecise post-divorce arrange-
ments to readjust liabilities and assets without judicial intervention.
The couple's agreement included a provision that the husband would
pay the wife $1,000 a month for one year. By its terms the agreement
could be modified only by an instrument in writing signed by both parties.
After the ex-husband had paid one-half of the installments, he wrote an
angry letter that elicited a poignant and ambiguous response which he
took to mean that he need not make the six future payments. But he did
not thereupon sign the ex-wife's letter in compliance with the terms of
the agreement so that it might be termed an agreed amendment. The ex-
wife's later demand for the future payments was interpreted by the ma-
jority of the court as a termination of her prior "offer" to waive the
payments.325
321. See Sever, 944 S.W.2d at 491.
322. See id. at 492.
323. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 485A (Vernon Supp. 1988).
324. 961 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], 1997, n.w.h.).
325. See id. at *6.
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